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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
TONI LYNN BIGGS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20051075-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals a conviction for attempted possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), a class A misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Terry 
L. Christiansen presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Does a computer check revealing that a vehicle is uninsured provide reasonable 
suspicion to stop the vehicle under the Fourth Amendment? 
In search and seizure cases, factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^ f 12, 103 P.3d 699. Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, f 9, 125 P.3d 938. Application of the law to underlying 
facts receives "non-deferential review." Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^ f 15. 
2. Did defendant's cursory trial court objection that a warrants check exceeded 
the scope of detention preserve her appellate claim that the dog sniff exceeded the scope 
of detention? 
No standard of review applies to this question. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Interpretation of the following statutes is relevant to resolution of this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302 (West 2004) (reproduced in addendum A) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-301, -302 (West 2004) (reproduced in addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Amended Information with two counts: 
Count I Unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a 
second or subsequent offense, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004); 
Count II Unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004). 
SeeR. 19-20. 
Defendant filed Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained in Violation of 
Defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights & Memorandum in Support Thereof. R. 42-48. 
The memorandum argued two points. First, it argued that "an officer may not stop a 
vehicle for lack of insurance based on a check of a computer." R. 47. Second, it argued 
that "the officer exceeded the lawful scope of the stop by failing to investigate the vehicle 
as possibly stolen. Instead, the officer simply ran a warrants check on the driver and front 
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seat passenger." R. 47. The memorandum did not argue that the dog sniff was illegal. 
See R. 42-48. 
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel stated that "the major issue for me is 
whether or not the stop is legitimate at the outset." R. 158: 22. She argued that "[tjhere is 
no reasonable suspicion with respect to someone who's driving a vehicle when the plate 
comes back and says that the actual vehicle is not insured." R. 158: 25. This is so, she 
argued, because the driver may be insured under "operator's insurance" even if the 
vehicle itself is uninsured. R. 158: 23-25. She also complained that the vehicle database 
is maintained by a private company rather than by a government agency and is updated 
only monthly. R. 158: 26. In an argument consuming ten transcript pages, defense 
counsel never argued that the dog sniff exceeded the scope of the stop. R. 158: 22-30, 
33-34. In fact, no one in the hearing mentioned the dog sniff. See R. 158: Word Index at 
1,3. 
The court denied the motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 
94-99. The court ruled that the traffic stop was justified at its inception on the ground 
that the driver was operating the vehicle without insurance. See R. 97-98 (addendum B), 
R. 158: 36-37. Like defendant's memorandum, the court's ruling did not address whether 
the canine sniff exceeded the scope of detention. See R. 96-99. In fact, the ruling did not 
discuss scope of detention. Id. 
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Defendant approved the findings. At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel 
volunteered, "And, Judge, if I could just note for the record that based upon our 
discussion with the defendant, with respect to the findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
I don't have any objections to those." R. 160: 7. She added, "I don't think there is a 
place for me to sign, but I can just put it on the record. I don't object." Id. 
Defendant pled guilty. On the State's motion, count I of the Information was 
amended to attempted possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, and 
count II was dismissed. R. 104. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to attempted 
possession of a controlled substance. R. 103. Defendant reserved her right to appeal the 
trial court's denial of her motion to suppress. R. 89; R. 160: 2-3. 
Defendant was sentenced to 365 days in jail, suspended during the term of a 36-
month period of probation. R. 123-24. Defendant timely appealed. R. 125-26. 
Defendant violated the conditions of her probation. R. 157. The trial court ordered 
her to serve 180 days in jail and complete the CATS program, and reinstated her 36-
month period of probation. R. 157. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On 17 February 2003, West Valley Police Officer Wade Sanders pulled a car over 
because the state computer showed that the vehicle was uninsured. R. 158: 18 (transcript 
attached as addendum C); R. 159: 4 (transcript attached as addendum D). Before 
stopping a vehicle, Officer Sanders runs a DMV inquiry as well as an NCIC inquiry to 
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verify that the vehicle is not listed as stolen, that the plate matches the vehicle, and that 
the vehicle is insured. R. 158: 18. Officer Sanders has stopped approximately 200 
vehicles, maybe more, for no insurance. R. 158: 19. In his experience, about 98 percent 
of the time the driver cannot produce proof of insurance or simply admits that the vehicle 
is uninsured. R. 158: 20. The computer indicated that the owner of the car was Toni 
Biggs. R. 159: 13. 
Officer Sanders pulled the car over and spoke to the driver, Tiana Tate. R. 159: 4. 
Defendant was the passenger. R. 159: 4-5. While speaking with the driver, the officer 
noticed that the vehicle's steering column was damaged and wires were hanging down, 
both signs of a possible stolen vehicle. R. 159: 5. 
The driver could not produce the registration, but the occupants indicated that the 
passenger—defendant—was the owner of the vehicle. R. 159: 5, 8. The officer asked for 
her name and identification "to verify the validity of the statement, and it was her." R. 
159:5. Defendant identified herself as Toni Biggs, but could not produce picture 
identification to verify her identity. R. 159:13. She was also unable to produce 
registration papers "to verify this was actually the vehicle" to which the license plates 
were issued. R. 159: 13. Officer Sanders wanted "to make sure more than that," since 
people sometimes steal vehicles and attach false plates. R. 159: 13-14. 
Officer Sanders had a canine officer with him, Officer Gray. R. 159: 5. "After 
[Officer Sanders] was making sure that the vehicle was not. . . stolen," he had Officer 
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Gray do a canine drug sniff of the vehicle. R. 159:6. The dog indicated on the exterior of 
the vehicle, then on several spots inside the vehicle, including the front passenger seat, 
where defendant was sitting and where a black purse and a small camera case were 
located. Id. The purse contained three syringes, one spoon with visible residue, and three 
small baggies. Id. One of the baggies contained 90 milligrams of methamphetamine. R. 
159: 6-8. The dog also alerted on a backpack in the back seat that belonged to Tiana 
Tate. R. 159: 10. The pack contained a syringe. Id. At some point Officer Sanders also 
ran warrants checks on both defendant and Tiana Tate, the driver. R. 159: 13. Tate was 
cited, but defendant, who had an outstanding warrant for her arrest, was arrested. R. 159: 
1 3 . '••• 
Insure-Rite is a private company that maintains the uninsured motorist database for 
the State of Utah. R. 158: 5,12. It gathers insurance records from every Utah insurance 
company every month and compares them to 1.7 million records from the Utah 
Department of Motor Vehicles. R. 158: 6. This database communicates with a server for 
the Department of Public Safety on which law enforcement may check for insurance 
during routine traffic stops. R. 158:6-7. 
The database responds to about 400,000 look-ups per month. R. 158: 6., It may be 
queried by a license plate number or by a driver's license number. R. 158: 15-16. The 
Utah Legislature requires that this database be audited periodically. Four audits have 
confirmed that the program is 98 percent accurate. R. 158: 10-11. 
6 
Insure-Rite also sends notices to motorists who appear to be uninsured for three 
consecutive months. R. 158: 8. When this program went into effect in 1995, 23 percent 
of Utah motorists were uninsured; the rate in 2005 was six percent. R. 158: 5, 10. 
Defendant had a prior drug conviction, making her eligible for a penalty 
enhancement. R. 159: 14. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant claims that the officer's computer check, which showed that her 
vehicle was uninsured, did not justify the traffic stop, because (1) the computer database 
does not "guarantee" that a vehicle is uninsured, and (2) even if her vehicle was 
uninsured, so long as the driver had operator's insurance—a fact not reflected on the 
database—the vehicle would have been in compliance with the law. Neither argument 
has merit. 
First, a traffic stop requires only reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is violating the 
law. The insurance database is 98% accurate. Thus, the officer knew with near certainty 
that the vehicle was uninsured. 
Second, the owner of an uninsured vehicle who permits it to be driven on a public 
highway is guilty of a class B misdemeanor regardless of the status of the driver. 
Operator's insurance protects the driver from prosecution, but not the owner. 
2. Defendant claims that the dog sniff exceeded the scope of her traffic stop. This 
claim is unpreserved. In the trial court, defendant primarily challenged the initial stop, 
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and argued cursorily that the warrants check exceeded the scope of detention. However, 
she never claimed that the dog sniff exceeded the scope of detention in either purpose or 
duration. Her dog sniff claim is therefore barred on appeal. 
It lacks merit in any event. It is foreclosed by Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 
(2005), a directly controlling case that defendant fails to cite. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A COMPUTER CHECK REVEALING THAT A VEHICLE IS 
UNINSURED PROVIDES REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP 
THE VEHICLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Defendant claims that "the officer's level-two traffic stop was unlawful where it was 
based only on a computer check that revealed a lack of insurance." Br. Aplt. at 1. More 
specifically, she argues that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion because he relied on a 
database showing that her vehicle was uninsured, but it did not show whether the driver 
had "operator's insurance." Br. Aplt. at 32. Hence, she asserts, the officer "proceeded 
with the stop based on limited information and a hunch." Id} 
District court's ruling. This claim was preserved by defendant and ruled upon by 
the district court. As defendant notes at length, the court's findings of fact read more like 
conclusions of law. See Br. Aplt. at 20-26; R. 96-97. However, the court did clearly rule 
that driving without insurance is a sufficient basis for a vehicle stop. R. 97. And "when a 
Defendant does not rely on the Utah constitution. See Br. Aplt. at 10-11. 
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trial court has failed to make findings of fact on the record/' the appellate court "will 
'assume that the [trial court found facts] in accord with its decision5 whenever it would be 
'reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings.5" State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1994) (bracketed material in original) (quoting State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 787-88 & n.6 (Utah 1991)). 
Controlling law. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV. "The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is 
always cthe reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion 
of a citizen's personal security."5 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,108-09 (1977) 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). Reasonableness "depends con a balance 
between the public interest and the individual 5s right to personal security free from 
arbitrary interference by law officers.'55 State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^  25, 78 P.3d 590 
(quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, All U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (citation omitted)). 
"The Fourth Amendment is n o t . . . a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 
(1985). 
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"[I]t is settled law that 'a police officer may detain and question an individual when 
the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to 
be engaged in criminal activity.5" State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, \ 10, 112 P.3d 507 
(quoting State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation omitted)). 
To justify such a detention, the officer's suspicion must be supported by "specific and 
articulable facts and rational inferences." Id. (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 
1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990)). It "cannot be merely an inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or 'hunch.'" Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). However, "[a] determination 
that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." 
Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)) (brackets in original). 
"Indeed, 'the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for 
probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.'" Id. (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). 
In evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop and detention, a dual 
inquiry applies. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 681. The first question is "'whether the officer's 
action was justified at its inception,'" and the second is '"whether it was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.'" 
Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). 
"As to the first question, a traffic stop is justified at its inception when the stop is 
incident to a traffic violation committed in [an officer's] presence." State v. Hansen, 
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2000 UT 125, f 30, 63 P.3d 650 (citations and internal quotations omitted, brackets in 
original). "[A]s long as an officer suspects that the 'driver is violating any one of the 
multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,5 the police officer may legally 
stop the vehicle." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)); see also State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657-58 
(Utah App. 1996) (upholding stop based on burned-out license plate bulb)); State v. 
Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah App. 1995) ("without the speeding violation, an 
equipment violation also justifies an investigative stop by law enforcement officers"). 
"Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must . . . last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop."' Id. at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 500 (1983)). "Once the purpose of the initial stop is concluded, however, the person 
must be allowed to depart. Any further temporary detention for investigative questioning 
. . . constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a reasonable 
suspicion of a further illegality." Hansen, 2000 UT 125, ^ J 31 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
A. The officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle for lack of 
insurance after the computer check revealed lack of insurance. 
Defendant argues that Officer Sanders violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping 
her vehicle because he "had only an unparticularized hunch when he initiated a stop. The 
limited information available in the context of this case was insufficient for reasonable 
suspicion." Br. Aplt. at 34. 
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A computer check showing that a vehicle is uninsured justifies a traffic stop. In 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, the officer "observed Hansen make an 
improper lane change. The computer check then revealed that Hansen's vehicle was 
uninsured." Id. at ^ 6 (footnote omitted). "Based on these facts, the initial stop . . . was 
reasonable." Id. at \ 30. In the instant case, the trial court relied on Hansen in ruling that 
the initial stop was lawful. See R. 97. 
Defendant attempts to distinguish Hansen on two grounds. First, she argues that 
"the defendant there did not challenge the initial justification for the stop," and so the 
supreme court "did not analyze whether a computer check that revealed no insurance was 
itself a sufficient basis for initiating a stop." Br. Aplt. at 33. Second, she argues that the 
officer "initiated the level-two detention after he ran the insurance computer check and 
observed defendant make an improper lane change," which alone "constitutes a traffic 
violation for a level-two detention." Br. Aplt. at 34. 
Defendant's first ground is not well taken because the supreme court did decide the 
question. After stating the applicable rule, citing legal precedents, and applying those 
precedents to the facts of the case, it concluded that "the initial stop . . . was reasonable." 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^  30. This Court earlier saw Hansen's stop the same way. It 
stated, "It is clear that Officer Huntington was justified in seizing Hansen because Hansen 
committed two traffic violations in the officer's presence. Consequently, Hansen does not 
dispute the legality of the initial stop and the first part of the Terry inquiry is not at issue." 
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State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, \ 10, 17 P.3d 1135, affirmed by Hansen, 2002 UT 
125. In short, the supreme court, this Court, and Hansen's counsel all agreed that his 
traffic offenses justified the initial stop. 
Defendant's second argument for distinguishing Hansen is equally unpersuasive. 
She states that the officer stopped Hansen "after he ran the insurance computer check and 
observed defendant make an improper lane change." Br. Aplt. at 34. This is true. See 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f^ 30. She also states that "[a]n improper lane change constitutes a 
traffic violation for a level-two detention." Br. Aplt. at 34. This is also true. See 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125,130. However, it does not follow, and nothing in either Hansen 
opinion suggests, that the vehicle insurance violation alone would not justify the traffic 
stop. On the contrary, the stopping officer had two independent grounds for the stop. 
Defendant declares that "a traffic violation did not occur here." Br. Aplt. at 34. 
This statement is based on nothing except her assertion that u[l]ack of vehicle insurance is 
not a violation of the Utah traffic laws. The vehicle insurance provisions are found in the 
Insurance Code." Br. Aplt. at 28. This assertion is both incorrect and irrelevant. 
First, the assertion is incorrect. The provision making it a class B misdemeanor to 
permit an uninsured vehicle to be driven on a Utah highway is Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-
302(1) (West 2004). That section is found in Title 41, entitled "Motor Vehicles." Thus, 
lack of vehicle insurance is a violation, not of the Insurance Code, as defendant claims, 
but of the Motor Vehicle Code. Of course, the Insurance Code does contain "vehicle 
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insurance provisions." Br. Aplt. at 28. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302(1) (West 2004) 
specifies what coverages vehicle owners' insurance must include in order to satisfy the 
Motor Vehicle Code insurance requirement. It is thus directed to insurance companies, 
not vehicle owners. 
Defendant's assertion that "a traffic violation did not occur here," Br. Aplt. at 34, 
also contradicts a statement in this Court's Hansen opinion. There, this Court stated that 
in executing the illegal lane change and driving without insurance, Hansen "committed 
two traffic violations." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, f 10. One of those "traffic 
violations" was the illegal lane change; the other was lack of insurance. 
In any event, whether failing to insure one's vehicle is a "traffic violation" is 
irrelevant. Level two stops are not limited to "traffic violations." So long as "specific 
and articulable facts and rational inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a 
person has [committed] or is committing a crime, an officer may initiate an investigative 
detention without consent." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ f 35 (internal quotations marks and 
citations omitted). 
Permitting a vehicle to be operated on a Utah highway without owner's security in 
effect is a crime: a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302 (West 2004). 
Therefore, where, as here, specific and articulable facts and rational inferences give rise 
to a reasonable suspicion that a person is permitting a vehicle to be operated on a highway 
in this state without owner's security, an officer may initiate an investigative detention. 
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Defendant also argues that the stop was illegal because "if the statewide computer 
system shows no insurance for a car, that does not guarantee that the car is uninsured." 
Br. Aplt. at 30-31 (emphasis added); see also R. 158: 9. This misstates the controlling 
standard. Fourth Amendment analysis does not turn on whether specific and articulable 
facts and rational inferences guarantee a person has committed or is committing a crime, 
but whether they "give rise to a reasonable suspicion" that she has. Hansen, 2002 UT 
125, f 35 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he likelihood of criminal activity need 
not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of 
satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. Multiple 
audits have confirmed that the database is 98 percent accurate. R. 158: 10-11. That 
readily meets the reasonable suspicion standard. 
In sum, Officer Sanders stopped defendant's vehicle based on a 98 percent 
likelihood that she was committing a class B misdemeanor by permitting an uninsured 
vehicle to be driven on a highway of this State. 
B. The possibility that the driver had operator's insurance did not 
preclude reasonable suspicion based on the vehicle's lack of 
insurance. 
Defendant further contends that Officer Sanders lacked reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was committing a crime because "he had no basis for suspecting one way or 
another that [the driver] was driving without the insurance permitted by law." Br. Aplt. at 
31. Because Utah law allows for "operator's insurance" as well as vehicle insurance, 
15 
defendant reasons, Sanders "proceeded with the stop based on limited information and a 
hunch." Br. Aplt. at 32. 
Whether the driver had separate "operator's insurance" is a red herring. The owner 
of an uninsured vehicle who permits that vehicle to be driven on a Utah highway commits 
a class B misdemeanor, regardless of the driver's status. 
Officer Sanders stopped defendant's vehicle for being in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-12a-302(l) (West 2004): 
Any owner of a motor vehicle on which owner's or operator's 
security is required under Section 41-12a-301, who . . . permits it to 
be operated on a highway in this state without owner's security being 
in effect is guilty of a class B misdemeanor . . . 
Defendant does not dispute that she permitted Tiana Tate to drive her motor vehicle on a 
Utah highway, or that her vehicle is one on which owner's or operator's security is 
required under section 41-12a-301. To permit such an uninsured vehicle to be operated 
on a highway in this state without "owner's security being in effect" is a class B 
misdemeanor. § 41-12a-302(l). The statute contains no exemption for the owner who 
permits her uninsured vehicle to be driven by a driver holding operator's insurance. Id. 
Consequently, a vehicle owner who permits an uninsured vehicle to be operated on a 
highway in this state commits a class B misdemeanor under subsection (1), irrespective of 
the insurance carried by the driver. 
Subsection (2) does contain an exemption, but only for the driver. The general rule, 
found in subsection (2)(a), is that a person who operates a motor vehicle with knowledge 
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that the owner does not have "owner's security" in effect for the motor vehicle is guilty of 
a class B misdemeanor. § 41-12a-302(2)(a).2 However, subsection (2)(b) exempts "from 
this Subsection (2)" a driver whose own vehicle insurance covers her operation of an 
uninsured vehicle. § 41-12a-302(2)(b).3 This is an "operator's policy." §31A-22-
303(l)(a)(ii)(B). Thus, a driver covered by operator's insurance commits no crime when 
driving an uninsured vehicle, but the owner who permits her to drive it commits a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Consequently, defendant's argument fails. While it may be true that Officer Sanders 
"had no basis for suspecting one way or another that Tate was driving without the 
insurance permitted by law," Br. Aplt. at 31, he needed none. He knew to a 98% certainty 
that the vehicle itself was uninsured, and thus that its owner was committing a crime 
under subsection (1), whether or not the driver qualified for an exemption under 
subsection (2). Accordingly, the stop was justified. 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302(2)(a) (West 2004) provides: 
(2)(a) Except as provided under Subsection (2)(b), any other person 
who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway in Utah with the knowledge that 
the owner does not have owner's security in effect for the motor vehicle is also 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor . . . 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302(2)(b) (West 2004) provides: 
(b) A person that has in effect owner's security on a Utah-registered 
motor vehicle or its equivalent that covers the operation, by the person, of the 
motor vehicle in question is exempt from this Subsection (2). 
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II. 
DEFENDANT'S CURSORY TRIAL COURT OBJECTION THAT THE 
WARRANTS CHECK EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF DETENTION 
DID NOT PRESERVE HER APPELLATE CLAIM THAT THE DOG 
SNIFF EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF DETENTION 
Defendant claims that "[t]he detention for the canine drug sniff exceeded the scope 
of the justification for the stop." Br. Aplt. at 38-39.4 This claim is raised for the first time 
on appeal and is therefore unpreserved. The trial court did not rule on it, because it was 
never presented to the trial court. Defendant does not claim that her trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance. 
"Before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the record must clearly show that it 
was timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWCAssocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894 n.2 (Utah 1988). "[T]he grounds 
for the objection must be distinctly and specifically stated," State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 
1141, 1145 (Utah 1989), and made in a "fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon." 
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah App. 1989), cert denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (1990) 
(quoting Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984)). That is, the 
objection must "be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error . . . 
complained of." Beehive Med. Elecs., Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 
1983). 
4
 Defendant does not rely on the Utah constitution. See Br. Aplt. at 34-40. 
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"The preservation rule is grounded in our adversarial system of justice, which looks 
to the parties to zealously advocate their cause before an impartial fact finder." State v. 
King, 2006 UT 3, f 14, 131 P.3d 202. "It is axiomatic in our adversary system that a 
party must raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its right to litigate the issue 
in subsequent proceedings." Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah App. 
cited in King, 2006 UT 3, f 14. Thus, Utah courts "have consistently held that a 
defendant who fails to preserve an objection at trial will not be able to raise that objection 
on appeal unless he is able to demonstrate either plain error or exceptional 
circumstances." King, 2006 UT 3, f 13 (citations omitted). Where an appellant "does not 
argue that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error5 justifies a review" of unpreserved 
issues, the appellate court will "decline to consider [them] on appeal." State v. Pledger, 
896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n. 5 (Utah 1995). 
Defendant here relies on neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances, but 
claims that she preserved this claim in the district court. See Br. Aplt. at 35. This 
contention is based on her motion to suppress, which she says "addressed whether the 
officer's investigation in this matter exceeded the scope of the justification for the stop." 
Id. 
That motion did not argue that the dog sniff exceeded the scope of the detention; it 
mentioned the dog sniff only in its recital of facts. See R. 43. It argued primarily the 
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initial stop. It included only a cursory argument that the officer exceeded the scope of the 
detention, reproduced here in its entirety: 
Moreover, the officer exceeded the lawful scope of the stop by failing to 
investigate the vehicle as possibly stolen. Instead, the officer simply ran a 
warrants check on the driver and front seat passenger. This was despite the fact 
that the information known to the officer at the time of the stop confirmed the 
car in fact was legally registered to Ms. Biggs. Under these circumstances, the 
officer exceeded the lawful scope of the stop. 
R. 47. This passage argued that police exceeded the scope of the stop, not by conducting 
a dog sniff, but by running a warrants check. Nothing in this argument would have put 
the trial court on notice that defendant sought a ruling "the canine drug sniff exceeded the 
scope of the justification for the stop." Br. Aplt. at 38-39. 
This omission was not cured in oral argument. At the suppression hearing, defense 
counsel stated that "the major issue for me is whether or not the stop is legitimate at the 
outset." R. 158: 22. She argued that "[t]here is no reasonable suspicion with respect to 
someone who's driving a vehicle when the plate comes back and says that the actual 
vehicle is not insured." R. 158: 25. This is so, she argued, because the driver may be 
insured under "operator's insurance" even if the vehicle itself is uninsured. R. 158: 23-
25. She also complained that the vehicle database is maintained by a private company 
rather than by a government agency and is updated only monthly. R. 158: 26. But in an 
argument consuming ten transcript pages, she never argued that "the canine drug sniff 
exceeded the scope of the justification for the stop." Br. Aplt. at 38-39; see R. 158: 22-
20 
30, 33-34. In fact, no one in the hearing mentioned the dog sniff. See R. 158: Word 
Index at 1, 3. 
The court denied the motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 
94-99. The court ruled that the traffic stop was justified at its inception on the ground 
that the driver was operating the vehicle without insurance. See R. 97 (addendum B), R. 
158: 36-37. Not surprisingly, the court's ruling did not decide whether the canine sniff 
exceeded the scope of detention. See R. 96-99. 
This Court should reject this claim as unpreserved.5 
5 
Defendant's challenge to the dog sniff lacks merit in any event. The 
constitutionality of canine drug sniffs at traffic stops was decided last year by the United 
States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (holding that a dog 
sniff that does not prolong an otherwise lawful traffic stop and "that reveals no 
information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to 
possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment"). See also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 
93, 101 (2005) (holding, in the context of a home search, that no additional Fourth 
Amendment justification is required for unrelated questioning so long as that questioning 
does not prolong an otherwise legal detention); United States v. Wallace, 429 F.3d 969, 
974 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that "[a]s long as the trooper's questioning [does] not 
extend the length of the detention,. . . there is no Fourth Amendment issue with respect to 
the content of the questions"). Defendant does not cite Caballes. See Br. Aplt. at iii; see 
also Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center, Inc., 2000 UT 90, \ 17, 15 P.3d 1030 (rejecting 
claims as "without merit" where litigant "did not even cite . . . established precedent"). 
The record is unclear on whether the dog sniff here prolonged the detention. See 
R. 159: 5-6. Neither court nor counsel had reason to clarify Officer Sanders's testimony 
on this point, because defendant was not challenging the dog sniff. "Appellants bear the 
burden of proof with respect to their appeals, including the burdens attending the 
preservation and presentation of the record." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^  17, 12 
P.3d92. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[OJral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18, \ 10,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the 
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Calif, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 
1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral 
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
RESPECTFULLY submitted o n ^ ^ F u n e 2006. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
41 CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-303 
a three-year period after successful completion of 
the course outlined in Subsection (2). 
(b) The insurer may require, as a condition of 
mamtaining the premium reduction, that the 
named insured not be convicted or plead guilty or 
nolo contendere to a moving traffic violation for 
which points may be assessed against the named 
insured's driver license except for a violation 
under Subsection 53-3-221(11). 
(4) Each person who successfully completes the 
course outlined in Subsection (2) shall be issued a 
certificate by the organization offering the course. The 
certificate qualifies the person for the premium reduc-
tion required by this section. 
(5) This section does not apply if the approved 
course outlined in Subsection (2) is attended as a 
penalty imposed by a court or other governmental 
entity for a moving traffic violation. 1999 
CHAPTER 22 
CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 
Part 3 
Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Section 
31A-22-301. Definitions. 
31A-22-302. Required components of motor vehi-
cle insurance policies — Excep-
tions. 
31A-22-303. Motor vehicle liability coverage. 
31A-22-304. Motor vehicle liability policy mini-
mum limits. 
31A-22-305. Uninsured and underinsured motor-
ist coverage. 
31A-22-305.5. Uninsured motorist property dam-
age coverage — Coverage limita-
tions. 
31A-22-306. Personal injury protection. 
31A-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages 
and benefits. 
31A-22-308. Persons covered by personal injury 
protection. 
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and condi-
tions to personal injury protection. 
31A-22-310. Assigned risk plan. 
31A-22-311. Definitions. 
31A-22-312. Liability for collision damage — No 
security required — No waiver — 
Section inapplicable to rental com-
panies disclosing charges. 
31A-22-313. Repealed. 
31A-22-314. Mandatory coverage. 
31A-22-315. Motor vehicle insurance reporting — 
Penalty. 
31A-22-316. Title. 
31A-22-317. Definitions. 
31A-22-318. Identification. 
31A-22-319. Prohibition on insurer requiring cer-
tain parts — Disclosure. 
31A-22-320. Use of credit information. 
31A-22-321. Use of arbitration in third party mo-
tor vehicle accident cases. 
PART 3 
MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
31A-22-301. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as 
under Subsection 41-12a-103(4). 
(2) "Motor vehicle business" means a motor 
vehicle sales agency, repair shop, service station, 
storage garage, or public parking place. 
(3) "Motor vehicle liability policy" means a pol-
icy which satisfies the requirements of Sections 
31A-22-303 and 31A-22-304. 
(4) "Occupying* means being in or on a motor 
vehicle as a passenger or operator, or being en-
gaged in the immediate acts of entering, board-
ing, or ah'ghting from a motor vehicle. 
(5) "Operator" has the same meaning as under 
Subsection 41-12a-103(7). 
(6) "Owner* has the same meaning as under 
Subsection 41-12a-103(8). 
(7) "Pedestrian" means any natural person not 
occupying a motor vehicle. 1987 
31A-22-302. Required components of motor ve-
hicle insurance policies — Exceptions. 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of 
policies purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's 
security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall in-
clude: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sec-
tions 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-304; 
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 
31A-22-305, unless affirmatively waived under 
Subsection 31A-22-305(4); 
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Sec-
tion 31A-22-305, unless affirmatively waived un-
der Subsection 31A-22-305(9); and 
(d) except as provided in Subsection (2) and 
subject to Subsection (3), personal injury protec-
tion under Sections 31A-22-306 through 31A-22-
309. 
(2) A policy of insurance or combination of policies, 
purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security 
requirement of Section 41-12a-301 for a motorcycle, 
trailer, or semitrailer is not required to have personal 
injury protection under Sections 31A-22-306 through 
31A-22-309. 
(3) (a) First party medical coverages may be of-
fered or included in policies issued to motorcycle, 
trailer, and semitrailer owners or operators. 
(b) Owners and operators of motorcycles, trail-
ers, and semitrailers are not covered by personal 
injury protection coverages in connection with 
injuries incurred while operating any of these 
vehicles. 
(4) First party medical coverage expenses shall be 
governed by the relative value study provisions under 
Subsections 31A-22-307(2) and (3). 2005 
31A-22-303. Motor vehicle liability coverage. 
(1) (a) In addition to complying with the require-
ments of Chapter 21, Insurance Contracts in 
General, and Chapter 22, Part 2, Liability Insur-
ance in General, a policy of motor vehicle liability 
coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a) 
shall: 
(i) name the motor vehicle owner or oper-
ator in whose name the policy was pur-
chased, state that named insured's address, 
the coverage afforded, the premium charged, 
the policy period, and the limits of liability; 
(ii) (A) if it is an owner's policy, designate 
by appropriate reference all the motor 
vehicles on which coverage is granted, 
insure the person named in the policy, 
insure any other person using any 
named motor vehicle with the express or 
implied permission of the named in-
sured, and, except as provided in Subsec-
203 MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 41-12a-303.2 
PART 3 
OWNER'S OR OPERATOR'S SECURITY 
REQUIREMENT 
41-12a-30l. Definition — Requirement of own-
er's or operator's security — Excep-
tions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "highway" has the same meaning as pro-
vided in Section 41-la-102; and 
(b) "quasi-public road or parking area" has the 
same meaning as provided in Section 41-6a-214. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (5): 
(a) every resident owner of a motor vehicle 
shall maintain owner's or operator's security in 
effect at any time that the motor vehicle is oper-
ated on a highway or on a quasi-public road or 
parking area within the state; and 
(b) every nonresident owner of a motor vehicle 
that has been physically present in this state for: 
(i) 90 or fewer days during the preceding 
365 days shall maintain the type and amount 
of owner's or operator's security required in 
his place of residence, in effect continuously 
throughout the period the motor vehicle re-
mains within Utah; or 
(ii) more than 90 days during the preced-
ing 365 days shall thereafter maintain own-
er's or operator's security in effect continu-
ously throughout the period the motor 
vehicle remains within Utah. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (5), the 
state and all of its political subdivisions and their 
respective departments, institutions, or agencies 
shall maintain owner's or operator's security in 
effect continuously for their motor vehicles. 
(b) Any other state is considered a nonresident 
owner of its motor vehicles and is subject to 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(4) The United States, any political subdivision of 
it, or any of its agencies may maintain owner's or 
operator's security in effect for their motor vehicles. 
(5) Owner's or operator's security is not required 
for any of the following: 
(a) off-highway vehicles registered under Sec-
tion 41-22-3 when operated either: 
(i) on a highway designated as open for 
off-highway vehicle use; or 
(ii) in the manner prescribed by Section 
41-22-10.3; 
(b) off-highway implements of husbandry oper-
ated in the manner prescribed by Subsections 
41-22-5.5(3) through (5); 
(c) electric assisted bicycles as defined under 
Section 41-6a-102; 
(d) motor assisted scooters as defined under 
Section 41-6a-102; or 
(e) personal motorized mobility device as de-
fined under Section 41-6a-102. 2005 
41-12a-302. Operating motor vehicle without 
owner's or operator's security — Pen-
alty. 
(1) Any owner of a motor vehicle on which owner's 
or operator's security is required under Section 41-
12a-301, who operates his vehicle or permits it to be 
operated on a highway in this state without owner's 
security being in effect is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor, and the fine shall be not less than: 
(a) $400 for a first offense; and 
(b) $1,000 for a second and subsequent offense 
within three years of a previous conviction or bail 
forfeiture. 
(2) (a) Except as provided under Subsection (2)(b), 
any other person who operates a motor vehicle 
upon a highway in Utah with the knowledge that 
the owner does not have owner's security in effect 
for the motor vehicle is also guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor, and the fine shall be not less than: 
(i) $400 for a first offense; and 
(ii) $1,000 for a second and subsequent 
offense within three years of a previous con-
viction or bail forfeiture, 
(b) A person that has in effect owner's security 
on a Utah-registered motor vehicle or its equiva-
lent that covers the operation, by the person, of 
the motor vehicle in question is exempt from this 
Subsection (2). 1998 
41-12a-303. Condition to obtaining registra-
tion, license plates, or safety inspec-
tion. 
The owner of a motor vehicle required to maintain 
owner's security under Section 41-12a-301 may be 
required to swear or affirm, in a manner specified by 
the State Tax Commission, or present other reason-
able evidence that he has owner's security in effect at 
the time of registering, obtaining license plates for, or 
a safety inspection of the motor vehicle. 2001 
41-12a-303.2. Evidence of owner's or operator's 
security to be carried when operating 
motor vehicle — Defense — Penalties. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Division" means the Motor Vehicle Divi-
sion of the State Tax Commission. 
(b) "Registration materials" means the evi-
dences of motor vehicle registration, including all 
registration cards, license plates, temporary per-
mits, and nonresident temporary permits. 
(2) (a) (i) A person operating a motor vehicle shall: 
(A) have in the person's immediate 
possession evidence of owner's or opera-
tor's security for the motor vehicle the 
person is operating; and 
(B) display it upon demand of a peace 
officer. 
(ii) A person is exempt from the require-
ments of Subsection (2)(a)(i) if the person is 
operating: 
(A) a government-owned or leased 
motor vehicle; or 
(B) an employer-owned or leased mo-
tor vehicle and is driving it with the 
employer's permission. 
(b) Evidence of owner's or operator's security 
includes any one of the following: 
(i) a copy of the operator's valid: 
(A) insurance policy; 
(B) insurance policy declaration page; 
(C) binder notice; 
(D) renewal notice; or 
(E) card issued by an insurance com-
pany as evidence of insurance; 
(ii) a certificate of insurance issued under 
Section 41-12a-402; 
(iii) a certified copy of a surety bond issued 
under Section 41-12a-405; 
(iv) a certificate of the state treasurer is-
sued under Section 41-12a-406; 
(v) a certificate of self-funded coverage is-
sued under Section 41-12a-407; or 
(vi) information that the vehicle or driver 
is insured from the Uninsured Motorist Iden-
tification Database Program created under 
Title 41, Chapter 12a, Part 8. 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
R. JOSH PLAYER, Bar No. 7768 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, Suite 3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
TONI LYNN BIGGS, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 031100766 FS 
Honorable Terry L. Christiansen 
The foregoing matter came before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress on February 25, 2005, the Honorable Terry L. Christiansen, District Court 
Judge, presiding. The State of Utah was present and represented by R. Josh Player, 
Deputy District Attorney. The Defendant was present and represented by Shannon 
Romero, Salt Lake Legal Defenders. The State called Ken Stuart of Insure-Rite and 
Officer Wade Sanders of the West Valley Police Department as witnesses. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the first determination that must be made when analyzing 
a search and seizure issue arising out of a traffic stop is whether the peace officer's 
actions were justified at the inception of the stop. 
=1 
2. The Court finds that the traffic stop of the Defendant was justified at its 
inception. The Court finds that a peace officer that has reasonable suspicion that a 
driver is operating a vehicle without insurance is justified in stopping that vehicle. 
The peace officer is not required to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
driver does not have insurance on the vehicle. In support of its findings, the Court 
noted that in State v. Hansen, 63 P.2d 650, 660, 2002 Ut 125 Tf30 (2002) the Utah 
Supreme Court found that an officer was justified in making an initial traffic stop was 
reasonable when he observed Mr. Hansen make an improper lane change and was 
suspected of driving without insurance. The Court also noted that an officer is 
justified in stopping a driver for a defective taillight ** Aw*} *l* *"*»*"»** «* 
3. The Court finds Mr. Stuart to be a credible witness. The Court finds that Mr. 
Stuart's testimony regarding the problem of uninsured motorists in 1995 to be 
credible. In 1995, when the Utah State Legislature was considering the uninsured 
motorist problem, approximately 23% of vehicles were uninsured. The Court finds 
that rate of uninsured motorists to have been a serious problem in light of the number 
of traffic accidents and resulting injuries. The victims of uninsured motorists are 
placed in a precarious position. 
4. The Court finds that the development of the Uninsured Motorists 
Identification Database Program and the attendant laws and regulations have been 
very effective in reducing the number of uninsured vehicles. Specifically, the Court 
finds that approximately 94% of all vehicles in Utah are now insured. 
5. The Court finds that there is a significant public policy interest in having 
peace officers check whether or not a vehicle is insured. If a motorist drives a vehicle 
that is not insured, and the driver is not otherwise insured, an accident can absolutely 
devastate the life of the victim of the accident. For instance, if an accident caused by 
an uninsured vehicle and motorists results in another's death or serious bodily injury, 
the victim or his family is left in a tremendously difficult position. 
6. The Court finds that the Utah State Legislature wants peace officers to ensure 
that vehicles are insured and set up the Uninsured Motorists Identification Database 
Program to enable that end. Further, the Court finds that it is a standard procedure for 
peace officers to check for insurance on vehicles. 
7. The Court finds Officer Sanders to be a credible witness. The Court also finds 
that Officer Sanders checked the Uninsured Motorists Identification Database 
Program. The Uninsured Motorists Identification Database indicated that the vehicle 
was not insured. The Court finds that a showing of no insurance on the Uninsured 
Motorists Identification Database established a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
there was no insurance on Defendant's vehicle. Accordingly, Officer Sanders 
rightfully conducted a stop of the vehicle based upon his reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that the vehicle was not insured. 
8. The Court also finds that society's interest in protecting victims from 
uninsured vehicles overwhelmingly outweighs the inconvenience to an individual of 
being stopped by an officer who finds the vehicle to be coded as uninsured on the 
Uninsured Motorists Identification Database. 
9. The Court finds that the Defendants motion to suppress should be denied as 
the officer's stop was justified at its inception. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court hereby makes the following 
^ 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that Officer Sanders stop was justified at its inception 
based upon his reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle was not insured. 
2. The Court concludes that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress should be 
denied. 
Dated this 2& day of , 2005 
BY THE CO 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was delivered to SHANNON ROMERO, 
attorney for the Defendant, TONI LYNN BIGGS, at 424 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 on this ""Z-\ day of Ap^i \ 2005. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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THE COURT: All right. That leaves us with the 
Biggs cases. Ms. Romero, are you ready to proceed? 
MS. ROMERO: We are, Your Honor, yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And I understand we're 
only going on one case; is that correct? 
MS. ROMERO: Judge, that's right. I believe it's 
the case ending in 3 66 that we're proceeding on. Is that — 
the second one on the right? I'm sorry, 766. I was close. 
MR. PLAYER: That's close. 
THE COURT: All right. And on the — the pretrial 
conference that was set in case ending 1125, are we just 
going to continue the pretrial? 
MS. ROMERO: Judge, we were trying to trail 
everything behind the motions so we would have some idea of 
what kind of resolution we could reach. 
MR. PLAYER: And, Your Honor, my understanding is 
that there's — today was also set for a motion hearing on — 
THE COURT: 506. 
MR. PLAYER: — on 506. And what — if I may, Your 
Honor. What happened in that case is there was a screw-up 
in my office and both of these cases were supposed to be 
given to the law clerk to do some research on this issue and 
only one of them was actually given to the law clerk. When 
we discovered that, I believe it was on Wednesday, I sent an 
investigator from my office to try to find this officer. He 
used to work for South Salt Lake. He's left. No one on 
South Salt Lake could give us any information on him. We 
looked again — we were looking yesterday. We can't find 
him. He's our primary evidence in the event this goes to 
trial, so I'd ask for one more setting and if we can't find 
him by then, I'll be dismissing this case. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll set it for — until 
March 14th at 8:30 on the case ending 506 for the hearing. 
And we'll also set the pretrial on the case ending 1125 for 
that date. That leaves us with the final case, case ending 
0766. The matter is set today for a motion to suppress. I 
don't believe that there is — at least a memorandum in the 
Court's file. Has the State prepared a memorandum? 
MR. PLAYER: Your Honor, the State has prepared a 
draft of a memorandum. And, as you know, I'm relatively new 
to this assignment out here. And I talked with the other 
attorneys in my office who say that we frequently wait until 
the testimony and file a memorandum after the hearing. So I 
have chosen to go that route. However, the Court may choose 
to rule on it today after — 
THE COURT: Well, why don't we hear the evidence 
and you can decide what you want to do. All right. Call 
your first witness, Mr. Player. 
1 I MR. PLAYER: Your Honor, the State would call Ken 
2 Stuart to the stand, 
3 , THE COURT: Mr. Stuart, come forward and be sworn. 
4 | KEN STUART, 
5 , called as a witness by the State of Utah, 
6 I being first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified on his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PLAYER: 
Q. Can you please state your name for the record. 
A. Yeah. My name is Ken Stuart. 
Q. How do you spell your last name? 
A. It's — actually, it was spelled wrong on the 
subpoena. It's spelled S-t-u-a-r-t. 
Q. And who are you employed by? 
A. I am the general manager for Insure-Rite. 
Q. And what is Insure-Rite? 
<I8 I A. Insure-Rite manages the uninsured motorist 
database for the State of Utah. 
Q. And could you explain to the Court briefly what 
the uninsured motorist database is? 
A. Sure. Back in 1995, the legislature was concerned 
about the — the high uninsured motorist rate in the state of 
Utah, which was around 23 percent at the time. And so they 
enacted legislation that required a private vendor — we 
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received the bid on that — to gather insurance records from 
insurance companies and match that data with information 
from the Department of Motor Vehicles, registered vehicles, 
and then put that on line for law enforcement to use during 
routine traffic stops. 
And so what that entails from us now is, every 
company that is licensed to do business in the state of Utah 
has to report their entire full book of business. Every 
insurance policy that they write, every vehicle driver 
combination, which represents about four million records 
every month, and then that data is matched with the 1.7 
million records that we receive from the Department of Motor 
Vehicles every month. 
And we have matching algorithms in place that 
match the vehicle registrations with the insurance policies 
that we receive, and that information is put on line for law 
enforcement. And currently now there are about 400,000 
look-ups every month on that. 
MR. PLAYER: Shannon, Ifm going to ask the Court 
to take judicial notice of that statute. Did you want to 
present your hard copy of that statute? 
MS. ROMERO: Yes. 
MR. PLAYER: Your Honor, I'd like to point out to 
the Court — 
THE COURT: Please. 
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MS. ROMERO: I t ' s j u s t fo r t h e C o u r t ' s 
in fo rmat ion , w e ' r e d e a l i n g i n A p r i l wi th s u b s e c t i o n ( 1 ) ( a ) . 
MR. PLAYER: of 31 ( a ) -22 -315 . 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PLAYER: And I think if the Court would note 
in (1)(a), it requires every person, every insurer to 
provide this information to — to Insure-Rite and to the DMV 
for purposes of keeping such a record of who's insured. 
THE COURT: All right. I don't know that I need 
to take judicial notice. It's part of a statute, so the 
statute obviously governs this Court as well as both 
counsel. 
Q. (By Mr. Player) Mr. Stuart, what is your 
understanding as to how this works, if a law enforcement 
officer were to check a vehicle to see if it was insured or 
not? 
A. The way that the — excuse me — the way that the 
program works, again, as I indicated, all that data is 
reported online to law enforcement and — in other words, the 
Department of Public Safety has a server that communicates 
to our server that is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week. That they submit to us a plate or a VIN either 
through online computers or through dispatch. 
Q. They being? 
A. Law enforcement. Excuse me. I'm sorry. Law 
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enforcement will submit to us a plate and VIN, and that will 
query our server, and then our server will respond and 
provide an online response — immediate response during 
routine traffic stops. 
And there are three possible scenarios that — that 
people can receive. One is, yes, that they are insured. 
And it will also provide the insurance company along with 
that response yes. And then there is a definitive no. And 
this requires a little bit of explanation. 
There's actually two other responses. There's a 
no and a not found. And the difference between the two is 
that, in a no, it's definitive. We have a mailing program 
or a mailing process that's defined in statute as well that 
requires us to send notice — send notices to motorists who 
appear to be uninsured for three consecutive months. We 
send them a notice, and if they do not respond with proof of 
insurance or proof of exemption from insurance, after that 
3 0 — or, excuse me, 90 consecutive days, then we send them a 
notice. And they have 15 days to respond to that. 
If they do not respond to that, we send them a 
second notice. And if they don't respond to that second 
notice with proof of insurance or proof of exemption from 
insurance, then we send their vehicle registration to the 
Department of Motor Vehicles to be revoked and they have to 
pay a $100 reinstatement fee along with re-registering their 
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vehicle. 
But in explaining the difference between the no 
and the not found, those people that have been through that 
process of us sending them notices, it's only then that we 
definitively give a no, they have not responded. Or if they 
have responded with proof of exemption from insurance, law 
enforcement will be able to see what their response was. 
For instance, if they responded "out of service," that their 
vehicle's out of service, it would say not — "no, not 
insured, responded out of service." So the officer could 
then say, "You know, you reported your vehicle out of 
insurance — or out of service" and they could take impound 
measures or whatever else they needed to do. 
But "not found," there's a high degree of 
probability that they are uninsured, we just have not sent 
them the notice yet at the time. 
So those are the three responses that law 
enforcement can then receive. Yes, they are insured; no, 
they're not insured, and not found. 
Q. And how often is — is it that you would send a 
message of "not found"? 
A. How often — you mean how frequently? 
Q. How frequently. 
A. Well, as I indicated at the outset, when we 
started this program in '95, the uninsured motorist rate was 
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about one in four. And now the current data that we have 
suggests — 
MS. ROMERO: I'd object that that's non-responsive 
to the question. The question was "How often do they report 
not found." I'm not sure — 
THE COURT: Well, I think he's just doing it the 
long way. I'll allow him to proceed. 
THE WITNESS: Sorry. I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
THE WITNESS: In other words, what I'm trying to 
say is: We've reduced the uninsured motorist rate down to 
about 6 percent. So the vast majority, the overwhelming 
majority are "yes, they are insured." And then the small 
portion would be "no." So it would be a very small portion 
that would be "not found" on that database. 
Q. (By Mr. Player) And when you said if it comes up 
not found, it's a very high probability that they're not 
insured, can you explain that? 
A. Sure. Again, the way that the — the application 
works is that we receive an entire full book of business 
from every insurance company every month. And that is 
matched with the motor vehicle records. And we do internal 
audits of that data and found that we're about 98 percent 
accurate. But, more importantly, the State, under mandate 
by the Utah Legislature, requires an audit of the program. 
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having our fifth audit. And all of those audits have 
concluded that our accuracy rate is above 98 percent. 
4 MS. ROMERO: And, Your Honor, I object to that, 
, That's hearsay. It's an outside audit done by a separate 
6 I individual other than this person sitting here today. 
7 , THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection, 
Q. (By Mr. Player) Mr. Stuart, what would keep an 
insurance company from simply refusing not to report their 
insureds to you? Are you aware of any safeguards that would 
suggest that it's really likely that they do report to you? 
A. Yes, I am. There are two things at play here. 
The first and, I guess, less convincing is that they can 
potentially be fined. And it's $250 per day that they are 
in non-compliance. But I don't think that's as convincing 
as the other more important issue, and that is that they 
have a business to run. And if their customers are getting 
pulled over or erroneously impounded or they're getting sent 
notices and being harassed by us, then they're going to 
immediately feel the impact to their business. 
So I think there's huge incentive from the 
insurance company's standpoint to comply. And most of these 
insurance companies have departments, as in plural, that 
enforce compliance by various states in the country. So 
there's — there is a fine, but there also, more importantly, 
11 
is that a loss of business they could face if — if customers 
were contacted erroneously. 
Q. Now, how often are these insurance companies 
4 I required to report their books to you? 
A. They're required to report their full book of 
g I business every month by the 7th of each month. 
7 I Q. Is that how they -r- most of them do it? 
A. Yes. All of them do it, yes. 
Q. Are there any insurance companies that report more 
frequently than that? 
A. No. 
MR. PLAYER: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Cross? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. ROMERO: 
Q. Mr. Stuart, if I can clarify, then, is Insure-Rite 
a private agency? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. You're not a State agency; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You just collect data? 
A. Right. We collect the data from the insurance 
companies and then — 
Q. The data you collect is not from the State of 
Utah, it's from the private insurers with respect to whether 
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there is insurance? 
A. The insurance data, yes, but the vehicle data is 
collected — 
Q. Right. That's — 
A. Yeah. Right. 
Q. That was my question. 
A. Right. 
Q. And, Mr. Stuart, are you aware whether or not it 
is — whether or not there's two different types of 
insurance? For example, if I own a car, I could have owners 
insurance on my vehicle; is that right? 
A. Right. 
Q. If I operate a vehicle, that insurance carries 
over; is that right? Let's say I rent a car. 
A. Right. 
Q. And I have insurance. I can drive the rental car 
with my insurance. 
A. Well, my understanding is that Utah's a vehicle-
centered state. In other words, vehicles are insured, not 
people. And that's — 
Q. Is that statutory? 
A. That's the — that's the primary focus that — that 
my understanding is. Is that when we track that, we 
actually track the vehicles. I 
Q. Okay. But a person can have operators insurance. 
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The title of the code is Owners or Operators Insurance or 
Security; is that right? 
A. Right. 
Q. Implying that there are separate insurance 
policies in owner or an operator. 
A. Correct. 
Q. So you can either be an operator of a vehicle with 
insurance — 
A. That's correct. 
Q. — or you can be an owner of a vehicle and that 
vehicle itself is insured. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Does your database distinguish between the two? 
A. It does. 
Q. And how does it do that? 
A. Well, again, as I indicated at the outset, we 
receive about four million vehicles which represents every 
vehicle-driver combination. So, for instance, my wife and I 
own two vehicles. 
Q. Right. 
A. So our insurance company would send four policies. 
And then, in addition to receiving — 
Q. The four policies would represent you, your wife, 
the two vehicles. 
A. For each car, that's correct. 
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the 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
That's correct. And then, in addition to that, 
Department of Public Safety sends us every driver 
license 
Q. 
A. 
up as we 
emphasis 
Q. 
insured, 
car 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
information. 
Right. 
And then we match that owner-operator information 
11. But my understanding is that the primary 
is put on the vehicle not the driver. 
Right. But you could — that's another way to be 
though, is an operator. Otherwise — 
Sure. That's correct. 
— your insurance company wouldn't send that — 
That's correct. 
— information over. 
That's correct. 
So there's no guarantee that a person driving a 
is actually the owner. 
A. 
Q. 
That's correct. 
So it could be an operator with their own 
insurance. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
driver. 
Q. 
That's correct. 
And your records would not reflect that. 
No. Well, they would be able to look up the 
You could look up the plate. ! 
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A. They could look up the plate, right. Or — and 
then — when — in the process of looking up that plate, they 
could also look up the driver's license number and get 
information based on — 
Q. But that's a totally separate inquiry. Running a 
plate is not going to tell you whether or not that driver 
has insurance. 
A. That's correct. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. What it will tell you is whether or not 
that vehicle's insured. 
A. That's correct. That's correct. 
Q. And just to clarify, all this information comes 
from the private agencies regarding the insurance; is that 
right? 
A. The insurance companies, correct. 
Q. Right. And those are private entities not 
affiliated with the State. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. All right. And they have a duty only to report 
once a month before the 7th of each calendar month; is that 
right? 
A. That's correct. 
MS. ROMERO: All right. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MR. PLAYER: No, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Stuart. Appreciate 
your coming to court. 
Call your next witness. 
MR. PLAYER: Your Honor, I'd call — I'd call 
Officer Sanders to the stand. 
WADE SANDERS, 
called as a witness by the State of Utah, 
being first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified on his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PLAYER: 
Q. Now, Officer — Officer Sanders, where is it that 
you work? 
THE COURT: Why don't you have him state his full 
name? 
MR. PLAYER: Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
Q. (By Mr. Player) Can you please state and spell 
your last name for the record? 
A. Wade Sanders, S-a-n-d-e-r-s. 
THE COURT: Is it Wade or Wayne? 
THE WITNESS: Wade, W-a-d-e. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
Q. (By Mr. Player) And what law enforcement agency 
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do you work for? 
A. West Valley police department. 
Q. And do you recognize the defendant in here today? 
A. Yes, ma'am. Or yes, sir. Sorry, Ifm extremely 
tired. 
Q. Need a haircut, I guess. And do you remember why 
it is you pulled this car over? 
A. It was for no insurance. The state computer 
showed that there was no insurance on the vehicle. 
Q. And do you remember making a report with regard to 
what — to whether there was insurance or not? 
A. Yes. My incident report documented that there was 
no insurance listed on the state computer. 
Q. And when you say state computer, what — what do 
you mean? Could you give us a little more detail about 
that? 
A. I run a — each vehicle that I stop, prior to 
stopping the vehicle, I run a DMV inquiry as well as an NCIC 
inquiry to make sure the vehicle is not listed as a stolen 
vehicle, as well as to verify the plate as matching that 
particular vehicle, whether or not the vehicle is insured, 
et cetera, depending on the — what kind of — different 
information. 
Q. Now, is this a technique you just developed on 
your own or were you trained to do this, to check for any 
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insurance in this manner? 
A. A little bit of both. It's mainly just experience 
and training itself, basically. 
Q. Do other officers, to your knowledge, use this 
same system to check if a car's insured or not? 
A. Yes. It's the only system we've got. 
Q. How many stops have you made on no insurance? 
MS. ROMERO: Judge, I would object. It's 
irrelevant to this case. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Player) Would you estimate how many times 
you've stopped somebody for no insurance? 
A. Approximately 200, maybe more. 
Q. Okay. And of those 2 00, when the computer says 
"no insurance," can you tell us how many times they've 
actually had insurance? 
MS. ROMERO: Objection, Your Honor. He may not 
know this. Pursuant to the code, the defense should — a 
citation for no insurance is presented down to the DMV or 
the court in written form. So this officer may not have 
that knowledge. 
THE COURT: Well, why don't we see if he has it? 
Ask if he has information that would reflect whether or not 
the computer was accurate or not. 
Q. (By Mr. Player) Do you have any knowledge of or 
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is there a way of you — have you discovered how often 
they've actually had insurance when you've stopped them? 
A. There's a state code that says they are required 
to show proof upon request. 
Q. Are you saying that that's one manner in which you 
have been able to discover that they've had insurance? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So of the somewhat over around 2 00 stops you've 
made, how often has it been that they've actually been able 
to show you proof of insurance? 
A. On the ones that I stop for "not found" or "no 
insurance," I'd say 98 percent of them cannot produce any 
paperwork to show that they've got insurance or they flat 
out tell me they did not have insurance on the vehicle. 
Q. And when you're referring to the code, you're 
referring to 41-12 — 41-12a — 
A. 303 or 302. 
Q. 3 02 and 3 03 requiring people to have — 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. — proof of insurance on them. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, they may go later to the DMV and show that 
they have proof. Do you ever get any feedback on that 
information? 
A. I don't get a whole lot. If I — if they do say 
20 
- that they've got insurance and they do not have proof on 
2 | their person or in their vehicle, I should say, I explain t 
3 J them that if they can prove to the city courts that they've 
4 I actually got insurance on the vehicle, they'll either 
dismiss this or lower the fine. Because that's up to the 
courts, not me. Because, like I said, they are required to 
show proof upon request, which is also a separate offense. 
Q. But you haven't been privy to or recall any sort 
g I of reports back to you or any information 
A. No, sir. 
Q. — suggesting percentage of when that happens? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. PLAYER: Your Honor, I have no further 
questions at this time, but I may need to ask some follow-
ups, depending on where the argument goes from the defense 
counsel. 
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MS. ROMERO: Judge, I don't have any questions of 
this witness. 
THE COURT: All right. You may step down. Thank 
22 I Y o u' sir-
23 I State rest? 
24 [ MR. PLAYER: State rests, 
25 I THE COURT: Do you have any witness testimony 
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today, Ms. Romero ? 
MS. ROMERO: No, Your Honor. No, Your Honor. I 
actually just have argument. So I don't know where the 
Court wants to — how the Court wants to proceed. Do you 
want me to present my argument first? I did file a motion 
in memorandum, so it's probably better for me to start and 
go from there. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MS. ROMERO: Okay. Judge, in this particular 
case, one of the issues — well, the major issue for me is 
whether or not the stop is legitimate at the outset. The 
reason why I'm challenging this is because, pursuant to the 
code section governing an insurance requirement, what we 
have is a requirement that a person have in the person's 
immediate possession evidence of that owner's or operator's 
security for the motor vehicle. And they also have to 
display that upon the demand of the police officer. 
And there's different ways that you can meet that 
requirement through an insurance policy, through a 
declaration page or binder notice, renewal notice, or a card 
that is issued by your insurance company. However, it is a 
physical requirement of having that card on your person, as 
the officer indicated, that even if someone tells them they 
have insurance, if they can't present that card to them, he 
cites them anyway, they have to go to the court or DMV, 
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whoever it is, and say, "Listen, I did have insurance; I 
didn't have my card with me," and they have to demonstrate 
in that manner that they actually do have the insurance and 
they did have it at the time of the operation of the 
vehicle. 
And itTs explicitly a defense under this 
particular code section, which is 41-12a-303.2, that's it's 
an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that 
the person had owners or operators security in effect for 
the vehicle the person was operating at the time of the 
person's citation or arrest. So long as they can product 
that proof, that is a valid affirmative defense for this 
particular charge. 
So explicitly under the statute, you can be cited 
and that's the only reason you can be cited is for not 
having that proof with you. In this particular case, Mr. — 
or Ms. Biggs was stopped solely as a result of the fact that 
the officer ran the plate on the vehicle and determined that 
the vehicle did not demonstrate that it was insured. 
However, as we all know, I think common sense 
experience, if you are insured as an individual, if you have 
a vehicle that is insured, you can drive another vehicle and 
still be insured. So that's operators insurance. If you 
have owners insurance, it's your vehicle that's insured. 
So, for example, if I loaned my car to my friend and they 
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drove my vehicle, if that person was involved in an accident 
in my vehicle, itfs still covered because that vehicle is 
covered as owners insured vehicle. 
If I!m driving a vehicle that is uninsured, I get 
in an accident but I am insured at the time, my insurance 
covers the accident in that particular case. 
In the testimony from the gentleman, Mr. Stuart, 
who testified regarding insurance and the way that this 
database is run, is that there's subsequent information that 
can be gained by an officer with respect to individuals 
regarding their driver's license and matching up names and 
try to figure out if that particular individual is insured. 
However, when you run the plates on a particular motor 
vehicle, the only information you're going to get back on 
that vehicle is whether or not that vehicle is insured, not 
whether that particular driver is insured. And that's the 
issue, I think, in this case, Your Honor. 
The issue is whether or not there was a reasonable 
suspicion to believe that person who is driving that vehicle 
is committing an offense. The mere fact that a vehicle may 
not show up on that database does not mean that particular 
individual's violating the law. It may be that the owner of 
the vehicle is violating the law, but there's no indication, 
unless the officer has specific knowledge of the owner of 
the vehicle and that vehicle belongs to them, recognizes 
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that person from a prior incident or something along those 
lines, where they can specifically identify the driver as 
the vehicle owner and tie those together in that manner. 
There is no reasonable suspicion with respect to 
someone who's driving a vehicle when the plate comes back 
and says that the actual vehicle is not insured. That has 
no relationship, in many cases, to the driver of that 
vehicle. Not all owners of vehicles are the sole drivers. 
We all know that. Anybody who has relatives, for example, 
people with children frequently allow their children to 
drive their vehicles. And that doesn't mean that the 
children are the owners the vehicles, it means that they're 
the operators at that particular time. 
And, again, there's two separate questions. And 
the way that the statute is written, it's very clear that 
statute 41-12a-3 03.2 says "evidence of owners or operators 
security." You can have two different types of insurance, 
and that was conceded by Mr. Stuart. You can either have an 
operators insurance policy or you can have an owners 
insurance policy. 
The only thing that an officer is going to get 
when they run a plate on a vehicle is whether or not the 
owners insurance policy is in effect, not whether the 
operators insurance policy is in effect. And in that case, 
there's no way to tie that particular driver to that vehicle 
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as owner or operator. So in this case, I don't think there 
is reasonable suspicion to stop the car based on the fact 
that the officer can't find information from the statewide 
computer system. 
The other issue and the other problem that I have 
in this case, if you look at the statute that we submitted 
to the Court, which is 31a-22-315, and based on the 
testimony of Mr. Stuart, private insurance companies give 
this information to the State of Utah and they are required 
to give that information on the 7th day of each month, after 
they have insured the individual. So we're relying upon 
private information, we're relying on information that is 
updated only once a month, and it could be as long as a 
month and a week after the insurance policy takes effect 
before it actually makes it on the state system. So there 
is a huge gap there. 
Whether or not this is otherwise reliable in other 
circumstances, I think, is irrelevant. I think the point is 
that we're relying on a private agency, number one, to 
provide information. We're relying on the insurers to 
provide the information to Insure-Rite, which is a private 
agency, and we're relying upon information that could be up 
to a month old by the time that it's submitted to the 
Department, by the time it makes it in to Insure-Rite, and 
by the time it makes it to a point where it can be accessed 
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by law enforcement. 
So we're not dealing with information — for 
example, registration information, the State of Utah handles 
that information. The Department of Public Safety, 
Department of Motor Vehicles handles that information. The 
minute I go and pay my registration fee for my vehicle, that 
information is input into the system by someone who is a 
state employee who is charged with that particular duty of 
entering that data. And it's simultaneous. As soon as it 
goes onto that database, it's available to anybody. And I 
also, of course, get the sticker and put it on my car. But 
if the sticker falls off and I'm stopped, an officer can 
certainly look up the fact that it is current, because it's 
information that's kept by the State, it's simultaneous and 
it's current. 
In this particular situation, we don't have that 
same guarantee. In this situation, we have a private agency 
doing this particular work. And, again, not on a regular 
basis. It's not a simultaneous update. Mr. Stuart 
testified that the agencies — the insurance agencies, 
provide the information to Insure-Rite once a month, 
pursuant to the statute, by the 7th day of each calendar 
month. And I think in those circumstances where it's not a 
simultaneous update, there's a tremendous risk of pulling 
someone over for no insurance when, in fact, they are 
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insured. 
In addition to that, I think the statute is very 
clear. The requirement is not that you appear on the 
statewide system. The requirement is that you have in your 
physical possession proof of insurance. So in this 
instance, I think that it's very similar to a seat belt 
violation which is it's not a primary offense. You can pull 
someone over for failing to signal, for running a red light, 
for speeding, things of that nature. And once you've 
stopped them and you've got them stopped already, certainly, 
you could ask for their title, registration, proof of 
insurance, things of that nature, because the statutory 
requirement is that you physically have in your presence 
proof of your insurance. 
And, again, the requirement is not that you have 
proof on the computer of the insurance, because you, as an 
individual insured person, don't even have the ability to 
provide that information to Insure-Rite. That information 
comes from private insurance companies. So you're relying 
upon a private company to get that information to Insure-
Rite, who then provides the information to the State. 
In this particular case, the insured's only duty 
is to ensure that they have a card on their person 
physically available to present to an officer. That's the 
obligation under the statute. Whether or not it appears on 
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the computer, I think, is irrelevant because that's not the 
requirement of an owner or operator of a vehicle in the 
state of Utah. The requirement is to have the proof 
physically available. And in that sense, I think it does at 
least implicitly seem to be a secondary offense, because the 
requirement is not to have proof on the statewide system or 
have a card that you can present to an officer. It's very 
clear the requirement is to have in your possession this 
information. 
And I think, certainly, this circumstance differs 
from a driver's license violation. For example, let's say 
an officer is familiar with a particular individual and can 
observe that individual, can see them driving a particular 
vehicle. That officer has experience with that person from 
prior stops or prior involvement with law enforcement 
significant enough that that officer can recognize that 
particular individual. That officer is aware that that 
person's driver's license was suspended a week ago when he 
stopped him and he sees this person driving. And he goes to 
the statewide system and confirms that the license is still 
showing as suspended. 
In that case, I think the officer gets to make the 
stop. The information is simultaneous. It's kept by the 
Department of Motor Vehicles. There's no possibility that a 
week has lapsed and the information hasn't made it into a 
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computer system. 
In addition to that, that particular officer 
recognizes that particular person and then, in recognizing 
that particular person, believing they don't have a driver's 
license, runs the check, confirms his belief it's possible 
this person does not have a license, then stopping that 
person would be reasonable. And I think that's certainly a 
different instance from this, where we're dealing with this 
situation where the requirement of proof is on the person 
operating the motor vehicle to have in their physical 
presence some type of insurance card or proof for an officer 
who needs it and to be able to present it at a particular 
point in time when it's requested. 
Again, it's not a situation where there's an 
alternative allowed for in the statute. The only way to 
meet this requirement under the statute for an operator or 
an owner is to present that proof in physical form. 
I think that's all I have. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Romero. 
Mr. Player? 
MR. PLAYER: Y'our Honor, in this case, I think 
defense is asking us to put the cart before the horse to 
some degree. They're asking us to essentially require what 
would be required to convict somebody for purposes of making 
the initial stop. I've got just a few points to make here 
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and I'll go through those. 
First and foremost, this is not specified by the 
Utah State legislature as a secondary offense. We know that 
they have the capacity to do that, they've done it with the 
seat belt law. They didn't do it here. 
The law requires that the — the law requires that 
people have insured vehicles to drive and that they be able 
to provide that certificate before they drive to an officer 
if they're pulled over. And defense counsel's right in that 
regard. But does this officer have probable cause to pull 
this car over based upon what he reads on the screen? He 
absolutely does. We don't have to have all the evidence 
that the crime's been committed. We have to have a 
requirement suspicion. He's got a database that he looks at 
where we've had testimony today that 94 percent of the cars 
on the road are now insured and that, of the ones where it 
says "not found," there's a high probability that those are 
not insured either. He simply needs to look at the database 
that's been provided by the legislature to give him 
articulable reasonable suspicion that this individual's 
committing the crime of driving without insurance and not 
being able to produce that card. And that's really the only 
thing he has to show at that point. 
And you've heard testimony today that it's a very 
reliable database that he's working off of when he does 
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that. Now, those are updated on the 7th of every month. 
But that doesn't mean a month goes by necessarily. Those — 
when someone signs up for the insurance, it could be 
anywhere between 3 0 days or a week, or maybe even like two 
days before they send their paperwork to get it done. So, 
yeah, some people may have to wait a month. But most people 
are not going to have to wait a month before that 
information gets reported to the system. 
So he's investigating at this point whether this 
case is driving without insurance and whether this 
individual's going to be able to produce that. When he's 
got that car in front of him, I would submit, Your Honor, 
that if she — that if that person who owns the car isn't 
driving, that person's aiding and abetting somebody else to 
drive a car who can't provide insurance for that car. It's 
the car that needs to be insured, not the driver. And that 
driver and the guy who — person who owns the car needs to be 
able to show that proof. And if the person knows that they 
don't have proof can insure that car, is letting somebody 
else drive the car, he's got reasonable suspicion that 
somebody in that car is violating the law. 
So it doesn't matter if she's the passenger or if 
she's the driver, but I think it's fair to say that somebody 
that the owner knows is driving that car if it's not showing 
up as a stolen car. And so you've either got the driver or 
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a passenger as a party to that offense. 
And at this stage, it's the State's contention 
that he's got enough information, based upon that thing, to 
have reasonable articulable suspicion which entitles the 
stop and which entitles him to do a further investigation. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Player. 
MS. ROMERO: And, Judge, can I just briefly 
respond to what Mr. Player said? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MS. ROMERO: Judge, my concern, I think, and my 
main point in this particular case is that the reasonable 
articulable suspicion goes first — it's two pronged. It 
goes to whether or not there is an offense being committed, 
but it also goes to whether or not that particular person 
that you are detaining and you're investigating is the 
person who committed the offense that you suspect. 
17 I And my concern, again, with the insurance issue, 
just kind of to recap what I've already said before, is that 
there is no guarantee that the operator of that vehicle is 
uninsured. That's not what the database can show you based 
on the license plate. What that can show you is whether or 
not they believe that that particular vehicle has proper 
information contained in that Insure-Rite database. And, 
again, we know that it's not kept up on a day-to-day basis 
and it's not simultaneous. 
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But what it does not show you, based on running 
that plate is whether or not the person who is driving that 
car is insured. And that is the particularized suspicion 
that you need is whether or not that person is committing an 
offense. That belief has to be tied to that particular 
individual. And in this case, the State of Utah permits 
owner or operator insurance. 
Again, I can go get a rental car. I don't have to 
buy the rental car's insurance; I have my own insurance. If 
I get in an accident, I'm going to be covered by my own 
insurance policy. And it's the same principle, I can either 
have an owners insurance policy on a vehicle or I can have 
an operators insurance policy. If I own a vehicle, my 
insurance will allow me to drive other vehicles and it will 
cover me in the event of any accident. Because there are 
two separate types of insurance basically that we're dealing 
with, one that deals with someone who can operate a vehicle, 
the other that deals with a vehicle itself, running a plate 
is not going to tell you whether or not the person driving 
the vehicle is insured. And I think the suspicion has to be 
particularized to that individual. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Romero. 
All right. I don't believe this is the kind of 
case that the State needs to provide a rebuttal memorandum. 
In the analysis of search and seizure cases involving 
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traffic cases, the first thing that the courts need to look 
at is was the officer's action justified at its inception? 
And State v. Hansen, in particular has given courts a pretty 
good checklist in evaluating whether or not search and 
seizure cases involving traffic cases, whether the officer 
has done the appropriate job. 
The first fact that the courts have to look at 
again is whether the officer's action was justified at its 
inception. Specifically, in State v. Hansen, there was a 
lane change and a suspicion of no insurance. And, of 
course, that was sufficient. I can't remember specifically 
the facts of Hansen, whether they identified whether the 
suspicion of insurance in and of itself would be sufficient. 
In that case, there was a lane change and a suspicion of no 
insurance and the fact that the court identified a suspicion 
of no insurance is certainly relevant. A defective brake 
light is certainly sufficient for an officer to stop. 
It seems to me that this case is — is a case where 
the officer doesn't have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that there was no insurance on the vehicle, he just has to 
have reasonable suspicion 
today. 
looked 
for the stop. 
I believe Mr. Stuart 
He indicated that 
at 
uninsured. 
this situation, 
when 
s testimony was 
the legis 
23 percent of 
That is a sobering statistic 
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all the traffic accidents and all the injuries that exist on 
the roads, if about one out of every four cars weren't 
insured, the victims of those traffic accidents are left in 
a pretty precarious position. And, apparently, what the 
legislature has done has been very effective, where he now 
indicates that 94 percent of all vehicles are now insured. 
It's a pretty good track record, and I think that what the 
State has done is certainly significant. 
I believe it is important for officers on the 
roads to check whether or not people have insurance for the 
very reason that if people are driving without insurance, 
they cause an accident, you can absolutely devastate 
people's lives. And someone who's driving without 
insurance, they cause death or serious injury, they're not 
able to cover that because of insurance, the poor victims 
are left in a tremendously difficult position. 
So I do think that the officers, as a standard 
means, do determine whether there's not insurance. I think 
the legislature wants them to do that by setting up this 
database. And in this particular case, that's exactly what 
Officer Sanders did; he checked the state computer, said 
there was no insurance on the vehicle. Based on that, he 
performed a traffic stop. I would submit that that is 
reasonable articulable suspicion that there was no insurance 
on that vehicle. 
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Now, you compare, I believe, the two factors in 
this case when you have the importance of people driving 
with insurance so that, when there are accidents, there's an 
ability to cover the damages and costs versus the 
inconvenience to the driver, if they are stopped, if they're 
not in the database. And in this Court's opinion, there is 
an overwhelming basis for officers to be allowed to stop a 
vehicle if in fact the database indicates that this vehicle 
is not insured. 
Accordingly, I am going to find that the officer's 
action was justified at its inception and deny the motion to 
suppress. 
Let's set it for pretrial the same day, and I do 
want the State to provide the findings and conclusions — 
MR. PLAYER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: — detailed in that regard, Mr. Player. 
And we'll set this for pretrial on March 14th at 8:30. 
(Whereupon, at 10:47 a.m., the 
hearing was concluded.) 
-oooOooo-
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on April 6, 2004) 
3 THE COURT: All right. State of Utah vs. Toni Lynn 
4 Biggs, 03766. Counsel, state your appearances. 
5 MS. ROMERO: Shannon Romero for Ms. Biggs. 
6 MS. TAYLOR: Lana Taylor on behalf of the State. 
7 THE COURT: Call your first witness. 
8 MS. TAYLOR: The State would call Wade Sanders. 
9 THE CLERK: Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are 
10 about to give in this preliminary hearing is the truth, the 
11 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
12 THE WITNESS: I do. 
13 THE COURT: Sit very close to the microphone, speak 
14 directly into the microphone. Speak very loudly so your 
15 testimony is heard by everyone in the courtroom. You may 
16 proceed. 
17 WADE SANDERS, 
18 having been first duly sworn, 
19 testified as follows: 
2 0 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
21 BY MS. TAYLOR: 
22 Q. Please state your full name and spell your last name 
23 for the record. 
24 A. Wade Sanders, S-a-n-d-e-r-s. 
25 Q. Where are you currently employed? 
-4-
1 A. West Valley Police Department. 
2 Q. In what capacity? 
3 A. Patrol Officer. 
4 Q. And were you working in that capacity on February 17th 
5 pf 2003? 
6 A. I was. 
7 Q. Did you conduct a traffic stop at 2450 South 3200 
8 West, here in Salt Lake County? 
9 A. Yes, I did. 
10 Q. And what was the reason for that stop? 
11 A. The vehicle showed no insurance on the state computer. 
12 Q. So what did you do? 
13 A. I followed the vehicle as it was driving in front of 
14 me. I stopped the vehicle for the no insurance, made contact 
15 with the driver. 
16 Q. And do you recall the driver's name? 
17 A. I do. It was Tiana Taylor or — yeah. 
18 Q. And was there a passenger in that vehicle? 
19 A. Tiana Tate. Yes, it was Toni Biggs. 
20 Q. And the individual you've identified is Toni Biggs, is 
21 that person present here in the courtroom today? 
22 A. She is. 
23 Q. Could you please point her out? 
24 A. Right there. 
25 MS. TAYLOR: May the record reflect identification? 
-5-
1 THE COURT: The record will so reflect. 
2 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Once you made contact with the driver, 
3 what happened? 
4 A. Well, as I was making contact with her, I noticed 
5 that the ignition column and steering column of the vehicle 
6 was damaged extremely bad. There was wires hanging down which 
7 are indications of a possible stolen vehicle. People when they 
8 steel vehicles, they will cause damage to the vehicle to make 
9 it so the steering wheel cannot — will unlock so they can 
10 start the vehicle and drive off. 
11 Q. Were you able to determine who was the registered 
12 owner of the vehicle? 
13 A. Well, because they had no paper of the vehicle, they 
14 indicated that Toni was the owner of the vehicle. So I asked 
15 her name to verify the validity of the statement, and it was 
16 her. 
17 Q. And while you were doing all of this, did you have any 
18 backup officers? 
19 A. I did. I had a canine officer with me. 
2 0 Q. And which officer was that? 
21 A. It was Officer Gray. 
22 Q. And while you were checking on the registration for 
23 the vehicle, what was Officer Gray doing? 
24 A. After I was making sure that the vehicle was not a — 
25 still listed as stolen, or stolen at all, I had Officer Gray do 
-6-
1 a canine drug sniff of the vehicle. 
2 Q. And did the — did the canine indicate on the vehicle? 
3 A. Yes, ma'am, he indicated on the exterior of the 
4 vehicle. 
5 Q. Then what happened? 
6 A. Officer Gray, based on the indication on the exterior 
7 of the vehicle, he then had the canine enter the vehicle to do 
8 an interior sniff of the vehicle. 
9 Q. Did the canine indicate on anything inside the 
10 vehicle? 
11 A. Yes, ma'am, he indicated on several different spots 
12 inside the vehicle. 
13 Q. And was there anything found — well, first of all, 
14 where was the defendant sitting in the vehicle? 
15 A. The passenger front seat. 
16 Q. And did the canine indicate on anything in that area? 
17 A. Yes, ma'am. There was a black purse, and also a small 
18 — what appeared to be a camera case that was right next to the 
19 purse. 
2 0 Q. And was that purse searched? 
21 A. It was. 
22 Q. Was there any contraband found inside? 
23 A. There was. There was several — there were three 
24 J syringes. One spoon had some visible residue in it, and three 
25 | small baggies; one that contained some white crystalized 
1 substance that appeared to be methamphetamine. 
2 Q. Was that baggie taken into evidence? 
3 A. It was. 
4 Q. Was it submitted to the State Crime Lab for analysis 
5 A. Yes, ma'am. 
6 Q. I'm going to show you what's been marked as State's 
7 Exhibit No. 1. Do you recognize what that is? 
8 A. Yes, that's the crime lab results. 
9 Q. And does that relate to this case? 
10 A. Yes, ma'am, it has the same case number, the same 
11 suspect name, and also my name there as the arresting officer 
12 Q. Does this reflect the analysis of the item that you 
13 found in this case? 
14 A. Yes, ma'am. 
15 MS. TAYLOR: Move for the admission of State Exhibit 
16 No. 1. 
17 THE COURT: Any objection? 
18 MS. ROMERO: Not at this hearing, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: It's received. 
20 (Exhibit No. 1 received into evidence) 
21 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Now, can you describe — or actually, 
22 what was the — what did the substance test positive for? 
23 A. I field tested the substance on scene; and it was 
24 tested positive for methamphetamine. 
25 Q. What did the State Crime lab results indicate? 
- 8 -
1 A. It also showed methamphetamine. 
2 Q. How much? 
3 A. Showed 90 milligrams. 
4 Q. And based on the appearance of — well, strike that. 
5 Was there any similarity in the appearance of the substance 
6 found in the baggie that tested for methamphetamine and the 
7 residue that you identified on the spoon? 
8 A. When they cook methamphetamine to use it, it turns 
9 more of a browner darker color, so it doesn't look exactly 
10 white. 
11 Q. And was the residue that you found on the spoon 
12 consistent with methamphetamine residue that you've seen in 
13 other cases? 
14 A. Yes, ma'am. 
15 Q. I believe you stated that you also found a syringe? 
16 A. Yes, ma'am, three syringes. 
17 Q. And were those -- did those appear to have been used? 
18 A. I do not recall at this time. 
19 Q. All right. Was there any other controlled substance 
2 0 or medical supplies in that purse with the syringes? 
21 A. No, ma'am. 
22 Q. Did you speak with the defendant about whether or not 
23 the car belonged to her? 
24 A. Yes, ma'am. She said the vehicle was hers, and it was 
25 also list — she was also listed as a registered owner of that 
1 
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24 
25 
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vehicle. 
Q. All right, and did the defendant make any statements 
about meth use? 
A. Yes, on the way to jail she spontaneously uttered that 
she uses meth because she had had some traumatic incidences in 
her life, and she uses meth to — because it gives her some 
relief of that. 
MS. TAYLOR: Thank you. I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Cross examination. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. ROMERO: 
Q. Officer, you initiated a stop on this vehicle because 
on the statewide system it did not reflect that it was insured? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Does that guaranty that a vehicle's not insured if it 
doesn't i 
A. 
Q. 
vehicle, 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
you with 
A. 
show up on that system? 
It's not a guaranty, no. 
Okay, thank you. With respect to the driver of the 
that person's name was what? 
I believe it was Tiana Tate. 
Were you familiar with Ms. Tate prior to this stop? 
Prior to this stop, no. 
Okay. Was Officer Gray, the officer who came to assist 
the canine familiar with her? 
I do not know. 
-10-
1 Q. All right. Let's see. Was there anything else found 
2 in the vehicle other than what you've identified here? 
3 A. As far as — 
4 Q. A syringe, any other paraphernalia, perhaps. 
5 A. Let me reflect on my notes. 
6 Q. Sure. 
7 A. Looks like there was also a backpack in the back seat 
8 also. 
9 Q. And did the canine indicate on that backpack? 
10 A. Yes, ma'am. 
11 Q. And was there anything found inside that backpack? 
12 A. Yes, ma'am, there was a syringe. 
13 Q. And was that deemed to be the belonging of Ms. Biggs 
14 or Ms. Tate? 
15 A. I believe that was Tate. She was also cited. 
16 Q. And what did you cite her for? 
17 A. Possession of drug paraphernalia, because she was not 
18 a diabetic. 
19 Q. And you questioned her about that? 
20 A. Yes, ma'am. 
21 Q. Okay, and with respect to this bag that you found in 
22 the front passenger area — 
23 A. Uh-huh. 
24 Q. — an you de sc r ibe t h a t a l i t t l e b i t b e t t e r for me, 
25 p l ease? 
- 1 1 -
1 A. Absolutely. On my notes there was a total of 
2 three; two were smaller ones that were inside a bigger bagf 
3 approximately this big. Without looking at them exactlyf 
4 that's approximately the size of the average ones. 
5 Q. So about two inches tallf maybe three inches tall? 
6 A. Probably two inches, I would guestimate, without 
7 looking at them. 
8 Q. About two inches wide, or wider than that? 
9 A. Probably inch-and-a-half, two inches, yeah. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. Then the smaller ones that were inside it, the one 
12 that contained the narcotics, was also inside that. 
13 Q. Was there any identification, any type of photograph, 
14 any type of identifying information inside of those bags? 
15 A. To my recollection, no. 
16 Q. Did you do a — did you arrest Ms. Tate at the scene? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Okay, was she booked into the jail? 
19 A. No, she was released on a citation. 
2 0 Q. Did you conduct a pat-down search of her? 
21 A. Yes, ma'am. 
22 Q. Did you find anything else on her person? 
2 3 A. No, ma'am. 
24 Q. Did you conduct a pat -down search of Ms. Biggs? 
25 A. Yes, ma'am. 
-12-
1 Q. And did you find anything on her person when you did 
2 that search? 
3 A. No, ma'am. I did ask — no. 
4 Q. That's okay. Did you ask Ms. Biggs whether or not 
5 this particular bag was hers? 
6 A. Yes, ma'am. After giving her Miranda, she decided she 
7 did not want to talk to me. 
8 Q. Okay. So Ms. Tate was simply cited and release, and 
9 Ms. Biggs was arrested? 
10 A. Yes, ma'am, she also had an outstanding warrant for 
11 her arrest. 
12 Q. Okay, that's okay. Just to clarify, there was a 
13 syringe found in the black bag in the front passenger area, 
14 and also a syringe found in the black bag that belonged to 
15 Ms. Tate? 
16 A. There was one syringe that was found to be in 
17 possession or to be the owner of Ms. Tate. Ms. Biggs had — 
18 Q. In the — that was found in a bag? 
19 A. It was a backpack. 
20 Q. Right, and with respect to the bags that were found in 
21 the front passenger area — 
22 A. There was a total of three syringes. 
23 Q. Were they similar syringes? 
24 A. Yes, ma'am. All diabetic syringes, the same. 
25 Q. So they were all the same? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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they're 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
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I don't know if they were the same name brand, but 
all the same. I mean, they're diabetic syringes. 
The same size? 
Yes, ma' am. 
Same dimension? You also ran a warrant check on 
Ms. Biggs; is that right? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, ma'am. 
And did you run one on Ms. Tate at the same time? 
Yes, ma'am. 
And one other question. When you ran this vehicle on 
the statewide system to determine whether or not you thought 
it may have insurance, is there a name that pops up as being 
associated with the vehicle at that time? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. So you were at — you knew at that time that the 
vehicle was actually registered to a Toni Biggs. 
A. Yes, ma'am, because it does say on there. 
Q. Okay, so you knew at — you knew at that point in 
time, despite the steering column, once you found out the 
passenger's identity, that that was consistent with the 
information you previously had? 
A. She did not have any picture ID to verify that. 
There was also no registration in the vehicle to verify this 
was actually the vehicle, without listing — looking at the 
actual VIN number. I would like to make sure more than that, 
-14-
Some people steel vehicles, take the license plates, stick it 
on a similar vehicle. 
Q. Right. No, I understand; but the information you had 
was consistent? 
A. After I found out all that, yes. 
MS. ROMERO: Okay, thank you. 
MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Anything further? 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, the State has no further 
evidence to introduce. I would state that the enhancement, 
the notice provision that has been provided in Count 1 of the 
Amended Information, making it a second-degree felony based 
on the prior conviction, it indicates that the defendant is 
subject to an enhanced penalty because of a prior violation. 
I would note for the record, your Honor, that the 
case No. 041100506, which is before the Court today for 
arraignment, that in fact, the date of occurrence, according 
to the information in that case and according to the Court's 
docket, is October 27th, 2002, which is prior to this offense. 
Your Honor, under State vs. Hunt, I believe if at 
the time of the conviction the defendant has been convicted 
of a prior offense, that they are subject to that enhanced 
penalty. I think the Court of Appeals was quite clear that 
that enhancement is applicable and should be considered at the 
time of conviction. So that is all the evidence that I have to 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
-15-
introduce. 
THE COURT: And what evidence do you have regarding the 
prior? 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, the provision in the Amended 
Information is simply a notice provision. 
THE COURT: All right. Counsel? 
MS. ROMERO: And Judge, I would object to this being 
bound over as a second-degree felony based on a prior. I think 
that it's very clear from the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
specifically Rule 4 — and I can't remember the subsection; 
I think it's (d) or (e) — that the State in any time prior to 
submission of the case, or prior to jury verdict can amend the 
Information. 
If in fact State has information that would constitute 
a prior conviction at that time, they can certainly do that. 
At this point in time they don't have a prior conviction. 
Therefore I don't think that the second-degree is applicable. 
THE COURT: Response? 
MS. TAYLOR: And, your Honor, I meant to provide 
the 
def 
Court with a copy 
sndant was charged 
controlled substance. 
II i 
enh 
Count 
^as charged 
I was 
of State vs 
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charged as a 
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possession of controlled substance, he was then subject to the 
enhancements on Counts II and III of the Information. All of 
those cases were tried together as part one criminal episode in 
one Information. 
The Court of Appeals made it very clear that if at the 
time of conviction on Count II, he had previous been convicted 
of Count I, that Count II would stand as a second-degree felony 
subject to this provision. 
Quite frankly, if the Court of Appeals thinks that 
it can be done all as part of the same case — in that case 
there was no evidence of a prior conviction at the preliminary 
hearing, even though they didn't specifically speak to this 
issue — I think it's clear that if it can be done under those 
circumstances, that for the purposes of today's hearing the 
true consideration of that notice — or of that enhancement, 
is what the facts are at the time of conviction on Count I. 
MS. ROMERO: And Judge, if can respond to that. 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. ROMERO: Unfortunately I haven't had a chance 
to read State vs. Hunt. I think it's a different situation. 
We' re not sure how that 
information was amended 
how that occurred. 
That 
case proce 
the day of 
At this point in time the 
is an element of the offense 
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trial 
State 
We don' t 
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mere fact that somebody's charged does not mean that they're 
going to be convicted of a particular offense. 
Under those circumstances I think that that portion of 
the Information should be stricken. If in fact the State has 
information at a later time where there is a conviction, or if 
we're going to try these cases jointly together, I think that's 
a separate issue. 
In this case that's not what we're dealing with. What 
they're saying is that we filed the charge and that's enough. 
I think that's not enough 
THE COURT: Okay. Let the Court look at the Amended 
Information. Did you receive a copy Counsel? 
MS. ROMERO: I did this afternoon, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, Counsel, point to any language on 
which you rely in Count I that requires the State, in order 
to bind your client over on a second-degree felony, has to do 
anything 
a second-
degree f< 
more than j 
MS. ROMERO: 
THE COURT: 
MS. ROMERO: 
-degree felc 
slony alone. 
degree felony is if 
that Ms. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, that's — that's a matter for trial; 
2 is it not? 
3 MS. ROMERO: Nor it's notr your Honor. I believe 
4 that at this stage the State has to present proof of a prior 
5 conviction. Otherwise it's not a second-degree felony; it's a 
6 third-degree felony. Certainly the way the State has decided 
7 to word this, I think is misleading. I think if you look at 
8 the code, it's very clear that it has to be a prior conviction. 
9 Again it constitutes an element. If it's something 
10 that raises an offense from one level to a subsequent higher 
11 level, that constitutes an element of the offense that the 
12 State must present proof on. 
13 THE COURT: Does Counsel not have a good point? 
14 In order for the elements of the enhancement provision to 
15 apply, is it adequate to just say it's the defendant's second 
16 violation, or must it be pled and proved as a conviction as 
17 opposed to a violation? 
18 MS. TAYLOR: And your Honor, certainly I do think 
19 that's an issue for trial. The notice provision is an attempt 
20 to put Counsel on notice that if at the time of trial she is 
21 convicted of an offense, then at that time she is subject to 
22 that enhanced penalty. 
23 I don't think it's an element. I think it's a finding 
24 for the Court to make; and your Honor, according to defense 
25 Counsel's argument, even if the Court binds her over on a 
-19-
1 third-degree felony, I don't think that's a critical issue, but 
2 even if the Court does that, if she gets convicted, if we do a 
3 trial on the oldest case, she gets convicted, then I get to 
4 file an Amended Information prior to trial. 
5 The reason that this notice provision is here is so 
6 that there is not a claim prior to trial that, "Well, this 
7 notice wasn't provided prior to the prelim." That somehow we 
8 have to go back, and now to have another prelim, because she's 
9 subject to an enhanced penalty. 
10 The statute is clear that this is an enhanced penalty 
11 for having done this before. It is not an element of the 
12 offense, but it is a penalty provision. 
13 THE COURT: Do you want to amend your Information 
14 to say that this is the defendant's second or subsequent 
15 conviction — 
16 MS. TAYLOR: I do, your Honor. I think at this time it 
17 is clear that she — 
18 THE COURT: — a s opposed to using the word "violation"? 
19 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I guess I — I think this 
2 0 language is taken straight from the code. I can certainly — 
21 THE COURT: Take a look and see. 
22 MR. TAYLOR: — take a look at that. 
23 THE COURT: Yes, check your code and let's see. It 
24 would appear that it's — 
25 MS. TAYLOR: Do you have a — 
-20-
1 THE COURT: — unless we really want to nitpick at 
2 the preliminary hearing, at least it appears that notice is 
3 provided to defense Counsel. That there is an enhancement 
4 being sought because of a prior conviction. If you want to 
5 use the word "violation" synonymous with the word "conviction," 
6 then you can deal with that at a later date with the trial 
7 Court. 
8 MS. TAYLOR: And your Honor, I think it is appropriate 
9 that she be bound over on a third-degree felony, but this is 
10 an attempt to make it clear that if at the time of trial she's 
11 convicted of that third-degree felony, that it actually becomes 
12 a second, if there is that prior conviction. 
13 MS. ROMERO: And Judge, that's all I'm asking for — 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 MS. ROMERO: — is a bind over, not as an enhancement, 
16 because we don't have proof of a prior conviction. 
17 THE COURT: You're right; and the Court has asked that 
18 question exhaustively. Now, you can look at the statute, see 
19 if it uses the word "violation" or "conviction" under Section 
20 58-37(1). Maybe Counsel would like to read over your shoulder. 
21 MS. TAYLOR: And, your Honor, it indicates that — 
22 THE COURT: Counsel, do you want to look at that. 
23 MS. ROMERO: Sure, absolutely. 
24 THE COURT: Just put it on the podium. Both of you can 
25 look at the language. 
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All right, here, subsection 58-37(8) (2) — 
That isn't the way you pled it. You have 
>, if you're looking for the enhancement. 
I am, your Honor; and it appears that this 
the enhancement shows as — 
I'll give you a chance. 
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opportunity to file an Amended Information if you want to, and 
you can clean it up. The Court will hear arguments from both 
sides of whether or not the defendant should be held to answer 
on the third-degree felony and the paraphernalia charge, with 
the enhancement notice being part of the bind over. 
MS. ROMERO: Judge, if I could address this briefly. 
Your Honor, the only information that we have in this case is 
that the officer found a bag that was in the front passenger 
area. Certainly that was where Ms. Biggs was sitting. 
However, there was an initial piece of paraphernalia 
that was consistent with the items found in that blag — black 
bag, excuse me, in the front passenger area with the syringes. 
There was also a syringe that was found in a bag in the seat of 
the vehicle that was admittedly owned by Tiana Tate, who was 
the driver of the vehicle. 
Again, according to the officer, this was consistent 
with the syringe that was in the bag that was in the front 
passenger area. There was no identification. There was no 
information that would tie Ms. Biggs to this particular bag. 
There was no ID card, for example. There was nothing of that 
nature that was contained in this bag that would indicate it 
was hers. 
The only thing that we have is the fact that she 
happened to be sitting in the passenger's seat. So for that 
reason, I would ask the Court not to bind over. I don't think 
-23-
1 there's been any proof presented of possession. 
2 THE COURT: You may be brief. 
3 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honorf the fact that she admits she's 
4 a meth user I think does tie her to it. 
5 THE COURT: There is a time honored principle of joint 
6 constructive possession on the floorboard of a car. It's about 
7 as time honored as it's going to get. Anything further? 
8 MS. ROMERO: No, your Honor* 
y THE COURT: The Court finds the crime is committed and 
10 the defendant probably committed it. She's held to answer on 
11 both counts. The matter's referred to — 
12 MS. TAYLOR: Are we going to do the arraignments on 
13 both of the cases now? 
14 MS. ROMERO: Judge, she's waived preliminary hearing 
15 with respect to case ending in 1125; and I believe she's 
16 already entered a not guilty plea on that case. The charge — 
17 the other charge we're dealing with from 2002 was just filed. 
18 Judge Roth did arraign her and appoint our office in that case. 
19 So we're asking just to have — wherever this Court decides to 
2 0 send these matters, everything go on the same date. 
21 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
22 THE COURT: We'll send all three Biggs' matters. Who's 
23 next in the rotation on — 
24 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Judge Christiansen has the next 
25 rotation; and it would be on May — I think it's May 5th; on 
-24-
1 May 5th at 8:30. 
2 THE COURT: All three cases are assigned to Judge 
3 Christiansen on the date and time stated. 
4 Now, let me ask a question, so that I get a little 
5 bit of sense on what's going on with the defendant. She was 
6 charged October — 
7 MS. TAYLOR: October 27th. 
8 THE COURT: No, February the 17th she has her first 
9 possession charge, right? 
10 MS. TAYLOR: Actually, your Honor, the most recently 
11 case — most recent case filed out here, actually the date of 
12 occurrence is October 27th, of 2002. 
13 THE COURT: All right, then you go to February the — 
14 MS. TAYLOR: The 17th. 
15 THE COURT: — 17th of 2003, and she's arrested again. 
16 Then you go to February the 19th, and she's arrested again. 
17 MS. TAYLOR: February 19th, two days later, yes. 
18 THE COURT: How much is bail? 
19 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor — 
20 MS. ROMERO: And Judge, she's posted bail on all cases. 
21 THE COURT: Now, if she's a risk to herself or the 
22 community, the Court has the right to address the question of 
23 I bail. I intend to do that. 
24 | MS. ROMERO: And Judge, if I may report some additional 
25 | information, that charge for 2002 was previously dismissed 
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downtown. It's now been re-filed out here, even though it 
was previously dismissed. It was set for preliminary hearing 
on two occasions. The State's witnesses failed to show, and 
again she posted bail on it, even though it's already been 
filed, dismissed, and she's back out here again on it. 
THE COURT: But the question is, is October the 27th of 
2002, the actual date of the violation? 
MS. ROMERO: Yes. 
MS. TAYLOR: It is. 
THE COURT: Then you have three months go by, and she's 
arrested on two more. 
MS. ROMERO: And Judge, we have no subsequent offenses. 
It's almost a — well, it's over a year now that these charges 
took place, if you look at the Informations. 
THE COURT: What do you have by way of a rap sheet that 
shows any further arrests? 
MS. TAYLOR: And your Honor, while we're looking for 
that I would just indicate that on Oct — or February 17thr she 
was arrested for this offense. She's then taken to the jail. 
While she's in the jail on February 19th is when they find more 
methamphetamine, which results in the other case. 
According to her rap sheet — 
THE COURT: Any further arrests since — 
MR. ROMERO: No. 
THE COURT: — the 19th day of February of 2003? 
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MS. ROMERO: Judge, according to the information that 
I've been given, which includes a rap sheet, there has — there 
have been no subsequent arrests. 
MS. TAYLOR: And your Honor, it does indicate that 
there were other — there are other charges that predate this, 
but none — 
THE COURT: But nothing — nothing subsequent. 
MS. ROMERO: Right. 
MS. TAYLOR: Since this. 
THE COURT: All right. Bail will remain; and all three 
cases are sent to Judge Christiansen. Now, tell me what else 
we can do to be helpful this afternoon? 
MS. ROMERO: Judge — 
MS. TAYLOR: Can I withdraw that exhibit, your Honor? 
MS. ROMERO: I have no objection to that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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